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The Common Law and Statutory Background
of the Law of Musical Property
George D. Cary*
This article comprises a brief but comprehensive presentation of the
history and evolution of the law of musical copyright; it is particularly
designed for the practitioner seeking a general view of musical copy-
right law before proceeding on to more specialized problems. After a
discussion of the English and American history of musical copyright,
the article examines the common law and statutory aspect of the
subject, and concludes by discussing the international rules and conven-
tions governing musical copyright.
I. INTRODUMCION
To discuss in an adequate manner the many facets of the history and
development of musical copyright would require a sizeable volume.
Obviously, space and time limitations require that the present discussion be
nothing more than a panoramic view of the entire landscape. Specific
points of interest to many may well be blurred or not visible at all. It is
for others to apply the field glass to such particular matters; the purpose
of this paper is merely to furnish a view of the overall background and
development of musical copyright.
Those who are familiar with Leoncavallo's famous opera I Pagliacci
will recall the opening prologue, which set the stage, so to speak, for the
performance to follow. This paper serves a similar purpose. Those wishing
to learn the details of the various specific aspects of musical copyright will
give their eager attention to each of the individual performers who are
participating today in our copyright operetta.
II. HISTORY
Music is one of man's oldest forms of activity. Men indulged in
singing long before they learned to read and write. The bards of old
composed their songs, sang them to those who would listen, and passed
them down to succeeding generations. Due no doubt to the fact that the
bards of those days did not have available such marvels as radios,
phonograph records, television, electronic amplifiers, motion pictures, tape
recorders, and other media of preserving and transmitting sounds, they
*Deputy Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office, Washington, D.C. This article
is based upon an address given before the Institute on Musical Copyright Law and the
Music Industry, Vanderbilt Law School, April 17, 1961.
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enjoyed a somewhat solitary prominence. Nevertheless the bards went on
composing and singing and apparently were content with passing their
art along to their successors without any real hope for commercial
realization thereof, or for a place in posterity.
When printing was invented, a new possibility presented itself-the
means for the realization of a desire for exclusivity. This realization may
be said to have resulted in what was probably the first law containing the
seed of copyright protection.1 It was promulgated in the Republic of
Venice in 1491, and in effect granted a monopoly to printers, not authors,
and thus was not strictly a copyright law. Nevertheless, it recognized an
exclusive right in a printed book, and it was only a matter of time before
the ownership of the newly recognized right was ultimately granted to the
creator of the work. In 1498, one Ottaviano Dei Petrucci, a Venetian
printer, obtained the exclusive right for twenty years of printing "figured
music." He possessed the reputation of being quite a perfectionist in the
printing of music; he must have been quite a businessman as well, because
he is reputed to have later left Venice and returned to his birthplace,
Fossombrone, where he obtained a patent from Pope Leo X which gave
him a fifteen year monopoly on the printing of music in the Roman states 2
At about the same period of history, a similar form of privilege was
evolving in England. In effect it was based upon political influence; if
one had enough of that, a patent could be obtained from the Crown grant-
ing the exclusive right to print certain works. In the year 1556, however,
this was changed by the establishment of the Stationers' Company.3 By
royal decree, this body was given the exclusive right over all printing in
the realm. The principal purpose of its establishment was to control the
press; the Grown felt compelled to see to it that no libelous, seditious or
heretical books saw the light of day.4 This monopoly, like the one in
Venice, belonged to printers, not authors. But by the establishment of a
register in which the member printers were required to record the books
they were publishing, each was enabled to ascertain what particular works
his competitors were publishing. Thus there grew up a basis for the
acknowledgement of the rights of others, a further evolution in the begin-
nings of our present-day copyright laws.
The enforcing agent of the Crown for the various decrees restricting
printing was the Star Chamber. When this was abolished, in 1640, there
began to appear some books not to the liking of the Crown, and Parlia-
ment subsequently enacted various Licensing Acts, which required all
books to be properly licensed. The last of these Licensing Acts expired
1. SHAFr=a, MUSICAL COPYBWGur 16-17 (2d ed).
2. Ibid.
3. Id. at 19.
4. HowL.L, THE CoPYiUon LAw 2 (3d ed. 1952).
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in 1694,s and thereafter a number of previously unlicensed printers invaded
the arena, thereby arousing some resentment on the part of the printers of
the Stationers' Company. Considering itself duly aggrieved, the Company
petitioned Parliament to grant to it all printing rights in perpetuity. The
result was the enactment of the Statute of Anne in 1710,6 which for the
first time granted statutory protection to authors, but only for a specified
limited time. Perhaps the printers considered that the statute gave them
most of what they wanted and apparently some of them may have even
believed that the right was granted in perpetuity, since the courts issued
many injunctions even after the expiration of the term of protection set
forth in the statute.7 However, in 1774, in the famous case of Donaldson
v. Becket,8 the House of Lords ruled that the statute extinguished all
common law rights in published works, though leaving untouched the
common law rights in works that were not published.
A few years after this decision, the United States came into existence,
its Constitution specifically providing for the granting of a limited exclusive
right to authors and inventors "to promote the progress of science and useful
arts."9 It is interesting to note that one of the first enactments of the first
Congress was the copyright law of 1790.10 This law, however, did not
include musical compositions within its scope; protection for such works
was not granted until the passage of the Act of 1831.11 The latter statute
protected only published music and did not include protection for the
performing right. This right was not recognized until 1897, when an
amendment to the copyright law, encompassing all public performances of
a copyrighted musical composition, was passed.
12
In 1909, when the present copyright law was enacted, 13 a number of
changes affecting music were made in the law. For the first time, un-
published music was brought under statutory copyright protection. The
performing right was limited to performances "for profit." Several rights
(e.g., the making of an arrangement) were specifically spelled out in the
statute. Probably the most significant innovation was the creation of the
compulsory recording license. In the words of the congressional committee
reporting the bill which became the 1909 law, the compulsory license pro-
vision was "the subject of more discussion and has taken more of the time
of the committee than any other provision in the bill."14 This was due to
5. DRiONE, THE LAw oF PROPERTY im INTELLEcTuAL Pi RoDUCTIONS 58 (1879).
6. 8 Anne, c. 19.
7. DrtONE, op. cit. supra note 5, at 71.
8. 4 Burr. 2408, 98 Eng. Rep. 257, 2 Bro. P.C. 129, 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L. 1774).
9. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
10. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. xv, 1 Stat. 124.
11. Ch. xvi, 4 Stat. 436.
12. Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. IV, 29 Stat. 481.
13. 34 Stat. 1075 (1909), 17 U.S.C. (1958).
14. H. R. REPl. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1909).
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the fear that an international music trust would control the exclusive
right of recording, and that this "might be as injurious to the composer as
it would be to the public." 5 The committee therefore saw in the com-
pulsory license provision "a law which would give to the composer the
exclusive right to prohibit the reproduction of his music by mechanical
means on the part of anybody if he desired, to secure to him adequate
compensation from all reproducers if he did not desire to exercise this
exclusive right to prohibit and to prevent the establishment of a great trade
monopoly."' 6
In brief, this innovation afforded to the copyright proprietor of a musical
composition the exclusive right to permit his composition to be recorded.
But once he permitted the composition to be recorded, anyone else could
obtain a license to make a recording thereof by paying the statutory
royalty rate of two cents and adhering to the prescribed formalities. In
practice, the recording companies today rarely use this statutory right, but
rely instead on a license secured by contract, which generally permits a
recording at less than the statutory rate, and without the statutory form of
reporting the royalties.17
In passing, it may be noted that for all practical purposes the courts have
generally considered that under the statute both published and unpublished
works possess the same rights; consequently, no attempt will be made
hereafter to distinguish between the two types of compositions unless
the purposes of this discussion so require. Two cases illustrate this
similarity of rights:
(1) Shilkret v. Musicraft.18 With respect to mechanical reproduction
rights, this case held that an unpublished composition enjoyed the
same rights as a published work, notwithstanding that the language
of the law specified that it included "only compositions published and
copyrighted after July 1, 1909" (emphasis added), which might seem
to restrict the right to published works.
(2) Marx v. United States.19 With respect to the duration of the
copyright term of an unpublished work, this case held that the term
begins on the date on which the application for registration is received
in the Copyright Office. This was held notwithstanding the statutory
language that the duration is computed from the day of first publica-
tion. Since an unpublished work obviously has no date of publication,
15. Id. at 8.
16. Id. at 9.
17. Burton, Business Practices in the Copyright Field, in 7 COPYMGHT PROBLEMS
ANALYZED 112-13 (1952).
18. 131 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1942).
19. 96 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1938).
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the court in effect interpreted the statutory language in a manner
designed to give the same length of protection for both types of works.
An apparent exception to the above generalization concerning the rights
enjoyed by both types of works is found in Edward B. Marks Music Corp.
v. Continental Record Co.20 This case involved the question whether a
musical composition originally published in 1902, prior to the effective date
of the current law, but renewed under the present law, enjoyed the
mechanical reproduction right. The court held that it did not because of
the specific language referred to above, limiting that right to works
"published and copyrighted after July 1, 1909." The argument had been
made that even though the original publication may have been made
prior to that date, the renewal under the current law being a new, inde-
pendent right gave rise to the application of the mechanical right pro-
vision from and after the date of renewal. The court, however, considered
that the specific language of the statute militated against this construction.
III. CoMvoN LAw IGHTS
Section 2 of the copyright law2' provides that "nothing in this title shall
be construed to annul or limit the right of the author or proprietor of an
unpublished work, at common law or in equity, to prevent the copying,
publication, or use of such unpublished work without his consent, and
to obtain damages therefor." This statutory provision specifically preserves
common law rights in unpublished works; just what this means in practical
effect may now be considered.
Mention was made earlier that in England the famous case of Donaldson
-v. Becket22 settled the law in that country to the effect that when copyright
protection was secured under the statute, all common law rights were
thereby lost. This doctrine was followed in the United States by the
equally famous case of Wheaton v. Peters.P The common law right re-
ferred to was simply the right of first publication; as long as an author
or composer retained his literary or musical creation it belonged to him
in perpetuity and he could go to court to restrain any unauthorized pub-
lication thereof. However, as soon as he published the work, he lost this
common law right. If he published his work in accordance with the
requirements of the copyright law, he thereby acquired statutory protection.
If the work was published without meeting the requirements of the copy-
right law, he then lost forever all of his statutory rights as well as common
law rights therein.
20. 222 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1955).
21. 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1958).
22. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
23. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
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It has long been held that a performance in public did not constitute
publication sufficient to cause the loss of the common law rights.24 Thus,
one might obtain perpetual right in a musical composition so long as it
remained unpublished. Hence, prior to the date of the first statutory
recognition of performing rights for musical compositions in 1897, it was
not at all uncommon for the producers of operas and other musical pro-
ductions to keep the original musical scores under lock and key as a means
of preventing piratical competing productions.28
One aspect of the danger of attempting to rely on such perpetual com-
mon law rights rather than obtaining statutory protection may be illustrated
by the case of Egner v. E. C. Schirmer Music Co.26 The famous Army
song, "The Caissons Go Rolling Along," was composed in 1908 by an Army
officer, Edmund L. Gruber. The song was played and sung in army camps
for many years. In 1918 there was published the sheet music of a composi-
tion, "The U. S. Field Artillery March," by John Philip Sousa, who had
incorporated most of the Caisson song therein. Gruber apparently knew of
this, but took no steps to protest. In 1921 two employees of the Military
Academy at West Point compiled a song book of popular West Point songs,
including therein the Caisson song with the express permission of Gruber.
In 1930, some 22 years after composing it, Gruber finally applied for
copyright registration. In the ensuing legal struggle over the rights to the
composition, the court held that the inclusion of the song in the 1921 West
Point compilation with the consent of Gruber caused the loss of any
copyright protection, since it constituted a publication without the required
statutory notice. The court reasoned that the compilers were mere licensees
and as such did not possess authority to obtain copyright for that particu-
lar composition when their songbook was copyrighted. Thus, the publication
of the songbook, absent any statutory copyright protection, resulted in the
loss of all rights, both common law and statutory, in the Caisson song.27
A different type of common law problem was presented to the court in
Supreme Records, Inc. v. Decca Records, Inc.28 This case indicates that
no common law right exists in an arrangement of a musical composition
recorded under license of a copyright proprietor, which arrangement is
dissociated from the copyrighted work itself. Both plaintiff and defendant
had licenses from the copyright owner of a musical composition to make
recordings thereof. Plaintiff brought an unfair competition action for
24. Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424, 435 (1912) (citing a number of common
law decisions); McCarthy & Fischer, Inc. v. White, 259 Fed. 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).
25. Smr-ra, op. cit. supra note 1, at 119.
26. 139 F.2d 398 (1st Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 730 (1944).
27. In 1957 a bill, H.R. 5782, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., was introduced in Congress to
pay General Gruber's widow the sum of $10,000 tax exempt, in full settlement of alt
claims respecting the composition. No action on the bill was taken.
28. 90 F. Supp. 904 (S.D. Cal. 1950).
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damages, alleging that defendant copied its own recording arrangement of
the composition. The court pointed out that the composer was not a party
to this action and remarked that in this respect the case was unique. Plain-
tiff claimed no rights in the copyrighted musical composition per se;
rather, it contended that it possessed rights in the special manner in which
it had recorded the composition, rights which could be asserted against
its competitor even though the arrangement itself did not give rise to any
rights which it might assert against the public. The court denied this con-
tention, stating that it was evident from a study of the copyright law that
Congress did not intend to give recognition to the right of arrangement, dis-
sociated from the work itself, to which the author claims the right. Otherwise,
a right could be segmentized and portions of it could be asserted by persons who
do not claim direct ownership of a musical composition, but merely certain
subsidiary rights.
29
As stated previously, as long as a work remains unpublished, the com-
mon law rights remain intact. For many years it was customary to sell
and distribute phonograph records on the assumption that, since under
White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.3° the record was not a
"copy" of the previously copyrighted composition, the sale thereof without
any copyright notice thereon did not constitute such publication as to
destroy all rights in the recorded composition. But supposing that the
recorded musical composition had never been copyrighted, could it reason-
ably be maintained that the sale of the record of the uncopyrighted
composition was in fact sufficient publication to destroy the common law
rights in the composition? This question was dealt with in a case some
ten years ago, a case which must have caused a few tremors in the music
publishing industry. It began as a simple infringement case involving the
composition "Yancey Special," in which it was alleged that the defendant's
"Long Gone" was the culprit. In holding that there was no infringement,
Judge Igoe, in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Miracle Record Co., said:
I might also add that the evidence is that Lewis abandoned his rights, if any,
to a copyright by permitting his composition to be produced on phonograph
records and sold some time before copyright. It seems to me that production
and sale of a phonograph record is fully as much of a publication as production
and sale of sheet music. I can see no practical distinction between the two.
If one constitutes an abandonment, so should the other. 3'
Although Judge Igoe's statement was dictum, its possible impact upon
the music industry was so great that counsel filed a motion for a new trial.
After argument on the motion for a new trial, the court stated that publi-
cation was not necessarily a technical definition but was more of a practical
29. Id. at 909. (Italicized in original.)
30. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
31. 91 F. Supp. 473 (E.D. Ill. 1950).
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question. It reiterated its reasoning that the wide dissemination of phono-
graph records was as a practical matter the equivalent of a wide sale of
sheet music. The court referred to RCA Manufacturing Co. v. Whiteman,
32
which had held that common law rights in the performance of a musical
composition ended with the sale of the records, and added that the
reasoning in that case applied with equal force to the case at bar.
Some four years later, the same problem arose in a case originating in
the southern district of New York. In Mills Music, Inc. v. Cromwell Music,
Inc.,33 Judge Leibell by way of dictum indicated that he also thought
that the manufacture and sale of phonograph records could constitute a
publication of the musical composition, which would destroy the common
law rights. But he offered the suggestion that if a statutory copyright had
been obtained prior to the time of the manufacture and sale of the records,
the sale of the records would have no effect on the rights of the composer,
since his rights would then be based upon the statute.
If Judge Igoe could argue that the logic of Whiteman, which involved
common law rights in a performance rather than in a musical composition
itself, would apply in Miracle Records, it would likewise seem that the
same logic would also extend to common law rights in a musical arrange-
ment embodied in a recording. And so the court held in McIntyre v.
Double-A Music Corp.3 In that case the court listed Whiteman as one
of the authorities for its holding that the distribution of phonograph records
containing an arrangement destroyed any rights that may have existed in
the arrangement. But the court apparently failed to realize that some three
years previously in Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records, Corp.,
35
which involved an artistic performance of a musical composition, a court
had considered that Whiterhan no longer was the law in New York. The
majority felt that Whiteman had been over-ruled by Metropolitan Opera
Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp.,3 with the result that the sale of
phonograph records of performances by musical artists did not constitute
a "publication" which would result in the loss of any common law rights
in the performance. Judge Hand, in a dissenting opinion, indicated his
displeasure with the view that sale was not a publication; in his opinion,
such a holding could only mean that a perpetual monopoly was created.
At the same time he expressed the realization of the harsh result that
would ensue under his view. He did not think, however, that his end result
was unjust, because the alternative was a monopoly unlimited in time and
"use.
32. 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940).
33. 126 F. Supp. 54 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
34. 166 F. Supp. 681 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
35. 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955).
36. 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd, 279 App. Div.
632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951).
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While this brief discussion does nothing more than touch a few of the
interesting aspects of common law rights in musical compositions, it does
illustrate the unsettled nature of the law and points up a difficulty en-
countered when one has to rely solely on common law protection.
IV. STATTORY PROTE= o N
A. Introduction
Perhaps one may best obtain a bird's-eye view of the scope of protec-
tion under the copyright law by briefly examining the statutory grants in
their numerical order as they appear in that law. However, it should be
noted at the outset that in order to be subject to copyright protection, a
musical composition must show evidence of some creative originality. Thus,
in the case involving the musical composition "Yancey Special," it was
claimed that the infringement lay in the copying of the bass. Although
the court noted that the bass in the allegedly infringing composition was
identical to that in plaintiff's copyrighted work, it held there was no
infringement because the bass was merely "a mechanical application of a
simple harmonious chord"; it was held to be "too simple to be copyright-
able."37
Another example of uncopyrightability concerned an unpublished musical
composition entitled "Tic Toc," which consisted of the words "Tic Toc,
Tic Toc, Time for Muehlebach" scored to the notes "C" and "G" in the key
of "C."38 The plaintiff admitted that the words "Tic Toc" were in the
public domain and also that the words "Time for Muehlebach" had been
used in prior uncopyrighted material. Plaintiff claimed, however, that the
music together with the combination of the words with the music con-
stituted copyrightable matter. The court bad no hesitancy in holding that
the jingle was not copyrightable, saying:
If all that an author of a musical composition does is to add a mechanical ap-
plication of sound to a word that is itself not copyrightable, and adds the same
to a descriptive phrase already dedicated to the public domain, without the
use of even the most simple harmonious chords, he has no musical composition
subject to copyright.39
The court added:
That the music claimed for his jingle is too simple to be copyrightable, that it is
a mere copy of what has been in the public domain of all music for centuries,
and that it may be reproduced, mechanically, by a clock, and is, therefore, standing
alone, not fit material or subject for copyright, should need no fortifying
authority.40
37. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Miracle Record Co., supra note 31, at 474.
38. Smith v. Muehlebach Brewing Co., 140 F. Supp. 729 (S.D. Mo. 1956).
39. Id. at 731.
40. ibid.
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With this basic concept in mind, the principal statutory rights affecting
music will now be examined.
B. Rights Under Section 1(a)
Section 1(a)41 affords the copyright proprietor the exclusive right to
"print, reprint, publish, copy and vend the copyrighted work." The rights
of printing, reprinting and publishing appear to be generally self-explana-
tory; they are continuing rights and exist throughout the life of the copy-
right. These rights form the basis for the publication of sheet music, a
right which does not today enjoy the commercial success it did in years
gone by, and so our discussion may well be devoted to items of more
immediate interest.
The right to vend is not a continuing right, and refers only to the right
of first sale.42 An interesting case in which a claim to this right arose
involved the unauthorized use by defendant of plaintiff's copyrighted poem
when the words of the poem were put to music and recorded. One of
plaintiff's arguments was that the sale of the defendant's records, since
they embodied his copyrighted words, constituted a violation of his
exclusive rights to "vend" the words.43 The court, however, held it was
bound by the Supreme Court decision in White-Smith Music Publishing
Co. v. Apollo Co.44 which held that a similar mechanical device did not
constitute a "copy" of the copyrighted work and consequently was not
protected by copyright. The court therefore considered it inappropriate
that the vending of something not protectible under the copyright law
could infringe in the manner alleged. It should be noted that under an
amendment to section 1(c) of the copyright law in 195245 a copyright
proprietor of a poem would today possess the exclusive recording right,
and the above case would require a different conclusion with respect
to this particular point.
The right of copying, as the word implies, affords protection to the
copyright owner against unauthorized copying of his work. In the case of
music, the transposition of a composition from the key of three flats to one
flat was held to constitute copying. 46 It is not necessary that the copying
be conscious; it is nonetheless copying if it is done from memory. The
court in Edwards & Deutsch Lithographing Co. v. Boorman,47 had this to
say on the point:
41. 17 U.S.C. § I(a) (1958).
42. Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908) (construing a similar word in
a prior statute); Fawcett Publications v. Elliott Publishing Co., 46 F. Supp. 717
(S.D.N.Y. 1942).
43. Corcoran v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 121 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1941), cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 687 (1941).
44. Note 30 supra.
45. 66 Stat. 752 (which became effective on Jan. 1, 1953).
46. Hein v. Harris, 175 Fed. 875 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910).
47. 15 F.2d 35 (7th Cir. 1926).
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One may copy from memory. It is not necessary to such act that the copied
article be before him at the time. Impressions register in our memories, and it is
difcult at times to tell what calls them up. If the thing covered by a copyright
has become familiar to the mind's eye, and one produces it from memory and
writes it down, he copies just the same, and this may be done without conscious
plagiarism. 48
C. Rights Under Section 1(b)
With respect to music, perhaps the most important right referred to in
section 1(b)49 is the right to "arrange or adapt it if it be a musical work."
This right belongs to the copyright proprietor and he may make an ar-
rangement of his work or may permit others to make the arrangement. It
should not be overlooked, however, that the arrangement, being an entirely
new work, is also subject to copyright protection and if a copyright
proprietor permits another to arrange one of his works, there should be
complete understanding concerning the ownership of the copyright in the
arrangement. Thus, if a proprietor of a copyrighted musical composition
authorizes another to make an orchestral arrangement, and to copyright
said arrangement in the name of the arranger, the proprietor of the original
work may not prevent sales of the orchestral arrangement as an infringe-
ment.5
An arrangement of an old song in the public domain is copyrightable,
and one who uses that copyrighted version without permission is liable
as an infringer, although he is of course entitled to utilize the public
domain version without liability. In Italian Book Co. v. Rossi 51 a Sicilian
sailor who played what he remembered of an old Sicilian folk song, and
improvised what he did not remember, copyrighted the version which was
written down at his request; this arrangement was sold to the plaintiff.
Action was brought against an alleged infringer, who protested that the
song was in the public domain. In holding the defendant an infringer,
the court said, with respect to the sailor's copyrighted arrangement:
No doubt he had heard some variation of the old song and was trying to
remember it, but the product differed in words and music from any version of it
that has been proved, although the theme was the same and the music quite
similar. To the extent of such differences he was the author of the new ar-
rangement of the words and music of an old song.5 2
If a piano arrangement is lawfully made from an unpublished version
of a melody, may one who copies the melody escape an infringement
charge by the owner of the copyrighted piano arrangement on the ground
that the original melody was not copyrighted, but only the piano arrange-
48. Id. at 37.
49. 17 U.S.C. § 1(b) (1958).
50. Edmonds v. Stem, 248 Fed. 897 (2d Cir. 1918).
51. 27 F.2d 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1928).
52. Ibid.
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ment? This question arose in connection with the composition "Rum and
Coca Cola." The court held that there was no reason for the defendant's
believing that the unpublished melody had been dedicated to the public,
and therefore rejected the argument that the plaintiff could not maintain
an action for infringement of the original melody.0
D. Rights Under Section 1(e)
From the dollars and cents viewpoint, perhaps the most important source
of income to composers and publishers today is the performing rights
royalties 4 It may be desirable, therefore, to look into the origin and
development of this right, which appears in section 1(e) of the copyright
law.P
In 1909, at the time of the enactment of the copyright law, the most
important source of income to composers was from the sale of sheet music.
However, with the advent of the phonograph record and radio and
television, this source of income has dwindled. On the other hand, the
right to perform a musical composition publicly for profit, which had
little meaning in 1909, has attained great significance in recent years.
It must be remembered that in the early days of section 1(e) there was
no organized means by which a composer or publisher could collect royal-
ties for the public performance of a musical composition. Moreover, it was
not clear just what was meant by the term "public performance for profit."
The practical impossibility of an individual composer or publisher col-
lecting royalties from around the country for such performances may well
be imagined. The well-known composers Victor Herbert and John Philip
Sousa experienced the unpleasant sensation of finding that their compo-
sitions were being played without their permission in restaurants, hotels,
and other public places, and they were unable to obtain any compensation
therefor. In an attempt to take some action against this unauthorized per-
forming of their compositions, discussions were held early in 1914 at
Luchow's restaurant in New York City; these meetings culminated in the
founding of the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers,
known generally as ASCAP.56 The Society at first concentrated on legal
action to obtain a definitive ruling as to the meaning and extent of the
right of "public performance for profit."
Early attempts by individual publishers or composers to obtain a court
ruling on this point had resulted in such cases as John Church Co. V.
53. Baron v. Leo Feist, Inc., 173 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1949).
54. This seems to have amounted to approximately $40 million in 1959-$30 million
to ASCAP and $10.5 million to BMI. See Variety, Feb. 17, 1960, for report on
ASCAP, and BMI, TwFr= YEARS OF SERVICE TO Music 10 (1960), for statement
of BMI income.
55. 17U.S.C. § I(e) (1958).
56. ASCAP, THE AscAP STORY (1951 ed.) (pages unnumbered).
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Hilliard Hotel Co.5 and Herbert v. Shanley Co.5 In both these cases copy-
righted musical compositions were performed publicly in a hotel and
restaurant, respectively, where there was no charge for admission, or other
direct pecuniary charge. The courts held the performance not to be "for
profit," saying that persons went into these places primarily for refreshment,
not to hear music. However, when the Supreme Court reviewed these cases,
a different result ensued. Mr. Justice Holmes, in a memorable decision,
commented as follows:
If the rights under the copyright are infringed only by a performance where
money is taken at the door, they are very imperfectly protected . . . . The de-
fendants' performances are not eleemosynary. They are part of a total for which
the public pays, and the fact that the price of the whole is attributed to a
particular item which those present are expected to order, is not important. It
is true that the music is not the sole object, but neither is the food, which
probably could be got cheaper elsewhere. The object is a repast in surroundings
that to people having limited powers of conversation or disliking the rival noise
give a luxurious pleasure not to be bad from eating a silent meal. If music did
not pay it would be given up. If it pays it pays out of the public's pocket.
Whether it pays or not the purpose of employing it is profit and that is enough. 5
In the following years, numerous legal actions were brought to protect
the performing rights, and as a result the courts held that music played in
dance halls, cabarets, theaters, and over the radio were public performances
for profit.60
In 1931, the Supreme Court was confronted with the question whether
multiple performances could exist in the same broadcast. It decided this
question in the affirmative. In Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co.,16 it is
reported that a hotel had furnished musical entertainment to its guests
through speakers installed in the public rooms and in the private rooms
as well. The "tuning in" of the radio broadcast by the hotel master set
was held to constitute a "public performance for profit." In this particular
situation the broadcaster did not have permission to perform the musical
compositions in question, and the Supreme Court did not decide whether
the performance on the part of the hotel in "tuning in" would have in-
fringed the performing rights where the broadcasts had been authorized by
the copyright proprietors. Justice Brandeis stated in a footnote that if the
broadcaster had been properly licensed, the hotel might have been con-
57. 221 Fed. 229 (2d Cir. 1915), rev'd on other grounds sub nora. Herbert v.
Shanley, 242 U.S. 591 (1917).
58. 229 Fed. 340 (2d Cir. 1916).
59. Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591, 594-95 (1917).
60. E.g., Harms v. Cohen, 279 Fed. 276 (E.D. Pa. 1922); M. Witmark & Sons v.
Pastime Amusement Co., 298 Fed. 470 (E.D.S.C. 1924); Jerome H. Remick & Co. v.
American Auto. Accessories Co., 5 F.2d 411 (6th Cir. 1925); Jerome H. Remick & Co.
v. General Elec. Co., 16 F.2d 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1926).
61. 283 U.S. 191 (1931).
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sidered as having an implied license to receive and distribute the broadcast.
Following such decision, the performing rights organizations, because of
Justice Brandeis' footnote, placed a limitation into their licenses to broad-
casters which prohibited the latter from granting to anyone else the right
to perform their music publicly for profit. A case which involved such a
license was Society of European Stage Authors & Composers Inc. v. New
York Hotel Statler Co.6 2 The main difference in this case was that there
were no speakers in the public rooms of the hotel, and the speakers in the
private rooms permitted the guests to select one of two programs received
by the master set. The court, however, found that there was a public
performance for profit, noting that the limitation in the license was a
"redundancy."
A subsequent case involved a radio station operated by a nonprofit
organization, broadcasting approximately two-thirds of its programs with-
out commercial sponsorship, and only one third commercially sponsored.
In that case,63 notwithstanding that the infringing performance occurred
on the sustaining portion of the program, the court held in effect that it
was a performance which, although not in itself a direct source of revenue,
is nevertheless "for profit" where it contributes indirectly to the commercial
value of other revenue-producing activities.
A recent application of this doctrine occurred in Leo Feist, Inc. v. Lew
Tendler Tavern, Inc.6A There music was played by means of phonograph
transcriptions and relayed to a client's restaurant over leased telephone
wires where it could be heard by customers of the restaurant. The court
found no difficulty in holding that this was nonetheless a public perform-
ance for profit.
It should be noted in passing that the copyright law lists two exceptions
to the performance right, namely, performances on juke boxes,65 and those
of religious or secular works where the performance is for charitable or
educational purposes and "not for profit."66 Only a few cases have been
brought by publishers or performing rights organizations to obtain a defini-
tive ruling on the so-called juke box exception. 67 However, because of
procedural inadequacies these cases shed no light on the problem. Most
of the efforts to nullify this exception have been directed to legislation
which would remove it, none of which, however, has been successful.68
62. 19 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
63. Associated Music Publishers Inc. v. Debs Memorial Radio Fund Inc., 141 F.2d
852 (2d Cir. 1944).
64. 162 F. Supp. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1958), aff'd., 267 F.2d 494 (3d Cir. 1959).
65. 17 U.s.c. § (e) (1958).
66. 17 U.S.C. § 104 (1958).
67. E.g., Buck v. Win. B. Kelly, 7 U.S.P.Q. 164 (D. Mass. 1930); Irving Berlin,
Inc. v. Anziano, 4 F.R.D. 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
68. For a sampling of the pros and cons, see Hearings on H.R. 5921, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1959).
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The second exception, the performance of religious or secular works
where the performance is for charitable or educational purposes and not for
profit, has rarely been litigated. However, in one case,69 the court inter-
preted the meaning of the language of section 104 as follows:
We think it was to permit certain high-class religious and educational compositions
to be performed at public concerts where an admission fee is charged, provided
the proceeds are applied to a charitable or educational purpose.7 0
E. Rights Under Section 7
Mention should be made of what is often referred to as the "new work"
doctrine. Section 7 of the copyright law 1 provides for copyright in certain
types of "new works." Primarily these involve compilations, abridgements,
and arrangements of works that are in the public domain or of copyrighted
works when they are produced with the consent of the proprietor, and of
works that are republished with new matter. In essence, what is provided
for is that any work, whether in the public domain, or with the consent of
the existing copyright proprietor, may be susceptible of such additional
intellectual labor upon it that the one performing this work may be able
to obtain copyright protection. The section provides, however, that when
such new work is published, it does not in any way extend any existing
copyright nor does it imply an exclusive right in the use of such original
works. In short, protection is afforded only to the new material added by
the author; any previous work in the public domain that may be utilized
is not thereby removed from the public domain, nor, if the new work
embodies a previously copyrighted work, is the copyright in the pre-existing
work extended in any way.
A case which illustrates this problem is G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc.72 Long wrote and copyrighted a novel entitled "Madame
Butterfly." He later authorized Belasco to write a play based upon the
novel, which play likewise was copyrighted. The copyright in the novel
was renewed, but not that in the play. During the original term of copy-
right, both Long and Belasco authorized plaintiff to prepare an opera based
upon the novel and play, which opera was also copyrighted. Long and
Belasco also authorized defendant's predecessors to produce a motion
picture from the novel and play. Plaintiff brought a declaratory judgment
action with respect to the motion picture rights in the opera. The court
held that any rights which plaintiff obtained from Long and Belasco
expired with the end of the first term of" copyright in the absence of a
new grant for the renewal term. Thus, in effect, the court held that what-
69. John Church Co. v. Hilliard Hotel Co., supra note 57.
70. Id. at 230.
71. 17 U.S.C. § 7 (1958)-
72. 189 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 849 (1951).
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ever was "new" in plaintiff's opera was protected for the full term of the
opera copyright, but that any portion of the opera that appeared in the
novel did not belong exclusively to it. Since the defendant possessed the
motion picture rights in the renewal copyright of the novel, it could
properly assert that the plaintiff could not make general use of the story
of the novel for a motion picture version of its opera. Because the copy-
right in the play was not renewed, the plaintiff, as well as the defendant,
was entitled to use whatever was copyrightable new matter therein.
The court in American Code Co. v. Bensinger73 stated the "new work"
problem in this manner:
If one takes matter which lies in the public domain, or which has been dedicated
to the public by publication without securing copyright under the acts of
Congress, and, adding thereto materials which are the result of his own efforts,
publishes the whole and takes out a copyright of the book, the copyright is not
void because of the inclusion therein of the uncopyrightable matter, but is valid
as to the new and original matter which has been incorporated therein. It is
necessary, however, to keep in mind the distinction between copyrightability and
the effect and extent of the copyright when obtained. The degree of protection
afforded by the copyright is measured by what is actually copyrightable in it;
that is, by the degree and nature of the original work.74
It goes without saying, of course, that the "new work" portion must of
itself be sufficient to sustain a copyright. In the case involving the song
entitled "My Melancholy Baby,"' 5 a second version was published shortly
after the original, both versions being copyrighted. The second version,
however, differed from the first only in the addition of another chorus
in march time but using identical lyrics and music except for a slight
variation in the bass of the accompaniment. The court held that this second
version did not constitute a copyrightable "new work."
V. INTERNATioNAL AsPEcTs
The foregoing illustrates a few of the problems one might encounter in
obtaining and enforcing copyright protection in the United States for his
musical compositions. In considering the protection of American works
in foreign countries, one might be tempted to recall, with some nostalgia,
those days when the world was smaller and protection outside of the
United States was generally considered unimportant. But today one
constantly reads of the use of American music in other countries, of the
reception given in those countries to American dance bands and symphony
orchestras, not to mention the riots that are sometimes caused by the
73. 282 Fed. 829 (2d Cir. 1922).
74. Id. at 834.
75. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 73 F. Supp. 165 (S.D.N.Y.
1947).
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performance of American "rock and roll" music. These events are some
evidence of the popularity of American music overseas and a reminder
of the importance of protection of American music in foreign countries. A
short discussion of the history of efforts to afford protection in foreign
countries may therefore be in order.
The "days when" the world was smaller may be pinpointed as the years
preceding 1891. In the 101 years following the enactment of the first copy-
right law in the United States, American citizens per se enjoyed no govern-
mental means of obtaining copyright protection abroad; foreign composers
were likewise denied protection in this country. During those years, it
was common practice to "pirate" foreign works in this country, and no
doubt there was some pirating of United States works abroad. The general
pattern of the 1891 legislation 76 was to extend the right to protection in
the United States to foreign nationals on a quid pro quo basis; that is, if
the foreign country-granted protection to United States nationals, then
the United States law would be available to them. The President was
required to issue a proclamation when he found that such reciprocal
conditions existed.
In 1909, the same general pattern was incorporated into the new law
Specifically, section 9(a) 77 permitted an alien author or proprietor who was
domiciled in the United States at the time of first publication of his work
to obtain protection for such work. It has been held that domicile is com-
posed of two things:78 (1) residence in the new locality and (2) the in-
tention to remain there. In a case where a Canadian citizen came to New
York, brought almost all of his property with him, resided there with the
intention to remain, became engaged to a New York girl, and the musical
composition composed by him was published while he so resided in New
York, the court found no objection to the copyright on the ground of
eligibility.7 9
It should be noted in passing that the language of the statute, by re-
quiring the alien author to be domiciled in this country at the time of "first
publication" of his work, seemingly would deny copyright protection to
a domiciled alien for his unpublished composition. At least one court °
has held such an author not eligible for protection. On the basis of this
decision, in order for a domiciled alien author to obtain statutory pro-
tection for his unpublished composition there would have to be a presi-
dential proclamation issued with respect to the country of which he was a
national.
76. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 565, 26 Stat. 1106.
77. 17 U.S.C. § 9(a) (1958).
78. G. Ricordi & Co. v. Columbia Graphophone Co., 258 Fed. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).
79. lbid.
80. Leibowitz v. Columbia Graphophone Co., 298 Fed. 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Under section 9(b),81 there are three situations in which a nondomiciled
alien author may obtain protection in the United States:
(1) when the country of which he is a national grants protection to
United States nationals on substantially the same basis as to its own
citizens;
(2) when the country grants protection substantially equal to the
protection of the United States law; or
(3) when the country is a party to an international copyright agree-
ment to which the United States may become a party.
In each of the three cases, the existence of the reciprocal conditions must
be determined by the issuance of a presidential proclamation. This action
of the President is a condition precedent to the right of a foreign national
to obtain United States copyright protection.82
It should be noted that the issuance of a proclamation under section 9(b)
would not of itself afford to the foreign national the mechanical reproduc-
tion rights of section 1(e), which have been previously discussed. This
results from the requirement contained in section 1(e) that foreign na-
tionals shall not be entitled to that particular right unless the foreign
country grants substantially similar rights to United States citizens. This
provision in effect requires the issuance of a separate proclamation
specifically mentioning the section 1(e) rights where a general section 9(b)
proclamation has been issued previously or, in the alternative, a definite
statement in the proclamation that both 1(e) and 9(b) rights are involved.83
In the years following 1909, the United States entered into bilateral
reciprocal copyright relations with almost forty countries on the basis of the
procedure provided in section 9(b).8 While in many of these instances
the mechanical reproduction rights were also granted, in others they were
not.
To anyone familiar with the paper work necessary before the presidential
proclamation is issued, it is clear that such procedures require many
months of study, negotiation, and drafting. Such lengthy, time-consuming
procedures have seemed unnecessary to some, primarily those familiar with
the operation of the so-called Berne Convention. Although numerous at-
tempts made to modify the United States law sufficiently to enable it to
adhere to that convention were unsuccessful, brief reference should be
made to its salient features in view of its standing in the world copyright
community.
81. 17 U.S.C. § 9(b) (1958).
82. Bong v. Alfred S. Campbell Art Co., 214 U.S. 236 (1909).
83. Portuondo v.. Columbia Phonograph Co., 81 F. Supp. 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1937);
Todamerica Musica, Ltda. v. Radio Corp. of America, 171 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1948).
84. 17 U.S.C.A. § 9 (Supp. 1961).
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The Berne Convention, first formulated in 1886, has undergone several
revisions, but some forty-four countries are adherents to one or more of
these revisions85 The basic concept of that convention is stated in article
4 in the following language:
Authors who are nationals of any of the Countries of the Union shall enjoy in
Countries other than the Country of origin of the work, for their works, whether
unpublished or first published in a Country of the Union, the rights which their
respective laws do now or may hereafter grant to their nationals, as well as to
the rights specially granted by this Convention.86
It is stated that the enjoyment of these rights is subject to no formalities8 7
The "country of origin" is so defined as to include a work published
simultaneously in a member country and a nonmember country, so that
such a work would be deemed to have originated in the member country86
It is this so-called "back door" provision on which many United States
publishers have expressed their reliance for protection in Europe, rather
than the rather complicated bilateral agreements entered into under the
provisions of the United States copyright law.89
Between the two world wars, a number of bills were introduced in
Congress which would have modified the copyright law to the extent
necessary to permit the United States to adhere to the Berne Convention,
but as previously mentioned, all failed. Thus, after the end of World War
II, a new approach was sought in the matter of international copyright
relationships. Under the sponsorship of UNESCO, the Universal Copyright
Convention was signed in Geneva in 1952, and came into force in 1955
when the required number of states had ratified it.9o To date, there are
thirty-nine countries which have adhered to it, including the United States,
Great Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, Argentina, Brazil and
Mexico.
The operation of the Universal Copyright Convention, or UCC, is basical-
ly simple. In essence, each contracting state agrees to protect the works of
nationals of other contracting states, and all works first published in those
states, without any formalities, except as mentioned below, in accordance
with the laws of that particular state. This is known as the "national
treatment" doctrine since the foreign nationals obtain the same treatment
as nationals of each country9 1 The statement that the protection is
85. Le Droit d'Auteur, Jan. 1961.
86. Quoted in RoTHENBEaG, CoPYRIGHT-LAw-BAsiC A RELATED MATERIALS 440
(1956).
87. See RoTHENBERtG, op. cit. supra note 86, at 440 (art. 4(2)).
88. Ibid.
89. See Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 4 of the House Committee'on the
Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 4, at 12 (1949); Hearings on Executive M. and S.
2559, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 123-24 (1954).
90. [1955] 3 U.S.T. & O.I.A., T.I.A.S. No. 3324.
91. The United States copyright law was amended in the few respects necessary to
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afforded "without any formalities" is subject to some qualification. In order
that the United States and some of the Latin American countries would
not have to give up their present copyright systems which are based upon
certain formalities, the convention provides that any contracting state
which requires compliance with formalities as a condition of copyright
(such as the United States) "shall regard these requirements as satisfied"
as to foreign works if the symbol @, the name of the copyright proprietor
and the year of first publication are placed on all copies of the work at the
time of first publication so as to give reasonable notice of copyright.
92
The effect of the Convention therefore is to afford protection to nationals
of contracting states when such a notice appears on the work. Conversely,
if such a notice appears on a work first published in this country, it is to
be accorded protection in all other countries of the UCC without further
ado. The present policy of the United States Government is to rely on the
UCC for all future copyright relations. Any existing bilateral relations are
not abrogated, but remain in force. However, for all practical purposes,
they have significance only in those countries which have not yet ratified
the UCC.
VI. CONCLUSION
This panoramic view of the law of musical copyright indicates that
historically, in the Western world, the exclusive right of composers in
their musical compositions developed out of a monopoly originally granted
to printers, which had as its purpose the control of the press. Then the
concept was shifted to the granting of a limited exclusive right to authors
"for the encouragement of learning" and "to the promotion of science and
useful arts."
In the United States, although a copyright law was first enacted in 1790,
it was not until 1831 that music was included within its protection; and not
until 1897 did the performing right become recognized. The 1909 law
limited the performing right to public performance for profit, and created
the innovation of the compulsory recording license. In addition, the law
specifically provided the right to make an arrangement which can be
applied to a copyrighted composition or to one in the public domain. The
right of public performance for profit, which was of relatively little com-
mercial value in 1909, has now become the tail which wags the dog. On
the contrary, the prime right of protection of sheet music, of great sig-
nificance in 1909, today is of relatively little value. Although not specifical-
ly a right restricted to music, the so-called "new work" doctrine has its
application in this field, and as the Ricordi case amply demonstrates, is
not always a matter of simplicity.
implement the Universal Copyright Convention by the addition of section 9(c) in
1954, which became effective Sept. 16, 1955.
92. Art. III. See note 89 supra.
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In the international field, prior to 1891, the United States law provided
no means of protection for works of foreign nationals on a reciprocal
basis. Since that date, however, the United States has, by a series of
bilateral arrangements and conventions, entered into copyright relations
with a considerable portion of the world's literate countries. Today the
Universal Copyright Convention is the outstanding means whereunder
foreign works are protected in this country and the works of United States
nationals receive protection abroad.
Inadequate though this resum6 may be with respect to shedding any
light on the practical everyday problems of those engaged in any field
of musical copyright, it is hoped that the general picture will serve as the
basis of a general understanding of the types of problems that beset the
field and furnish an inducement to a further, more specialized and detailed
treatment of particular problems.

